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The authors find suggestive evidence that the
association is related to the crude divorce rate,
but not to the generosity of the welfare state
in these countries. The implications of these
findings for understanding the stratification in
family dissolution are discussed.
Advantaged family backgrounds pave the way
to higher education, higher incomes, and better
health (Breen & Jonsson, 2005; Elo, 2009).
Higher socioeconomic backgrounds are also
related to many favorable family demographic
outcomes, such as postponement of childbear-
ing beyond adolescence (Dahlberg, 2015) and
marriage with highly educated partners (cf.
Schwartz, 2013). Do favorable family back-
grounds also beget family stability and the
benefits associated with it? Recent research has
paid much attention to the growing educational
disparities in family dissolution (e.g., Amato,
2010; Härkönen&Dronkers, 2006;McLahanan,
2004), but this interest has not been matched by
a similar focus on family dissolution patterns
by parental educational background. Because of
the importance of family background on indi-
viduals’ future life chances, this omission limits
our understanding of the social stratification in
family demography.
Previous studies on the association between
parental education and family dissolution have
produced intriguing findings. In contrast to the
increasingly negative association between own
education and family dissolution in many soci-
eties (Härkönen & Dronkers, 2006), many stud-
ies have found a positive association between
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parental education and family dissolution (Swe-
den: Hoem & Hoem, 1992; the Netherlands:
Klijzing, 1992; Janssen, 2001; Finnish women:
Mäenpää & Jalovaara, 2014; Italy: Todesco,
2013), even when the relationship between
own education and family dissolution is neg-
ative (Norway: Lyngstad, 2004, 2006). This
suggests a nuance to perspectives of the lower
status character of family dissolution that have
come to dominate the literature on stratification
of family instability. However, other studies
reported zero relationships (Australia: Bracher,
Santow, Morgan, & Trussel, 1993; United King-
dom: Berrington & Diamond, 1999; Finnish
men: Mäenpää & Jalovaara, 2014) or a negative
association (United States: Bumpass, Martin,
& Sweet, 1991), suggesting that the associ-
ation may vary cross-nationally akin to the
relationship between own education and family
dissolution (Härkönen & Dronkers, 2006; Mar-
tin, 2006; Matysiak, Styrc, & Vignoli, 2014).
Many of the above studies are also rather dated,
raising the possibility that the association has
changed over time, potentially from a positive
to a negative one as has been reported for
the educational gradient of divorce in many
countries (Chan & Halpin, 2008; De Graaf &
Kalmijn, 2006; Härkönen & Dronkers, 2006;
Hoem, 1997; Raymo & Iwasawa, 2017).
This study presents the first comparative
analysis of the association between parental edu-
cation and family dissolution. In light of the pre-
vious discussion, we first ask whether parental
education is related to family dissolution in 17
European societies and whether this association
varies cross-nationally. Second, has this associa-
tion changed over time? Third, to understand the
causes of the variation across societal contexts,
we analyze whether cross-national and cohort
differences in the association can be linked to
two contextual-level variables that reflect the
sociocultural and economic contexts of family
life, namely, the average crude divorce rate and
the generosity of the welfare state. Our analysis
contributes to the understanding of (variation
in) stratification of family dissolution and of
intergenerational effects on family dissolution,
other family demographic behaviors (Dahlberg,
2015; Dronkers & Härkönen, 2008; South,
2001; Wiik, 2009; Wolfinger, 2003), and life
chances more generally. We use family history
data from the Generations and Gender Study
(GGS) and Harmonized Histories data sets. Our
outcome is the dissolution of first childbearing
unions, which is more suitable than divorce as
a measure of family instability given the high
cohabitation rates in the countries we analyze.
Background
Why Do Divorce Risks Vary by Parental
Education?
Theorizing about why parental education would
matter for their children’s union dissolution
has been sparse. The existing explanations for
the association between parental education and
union dissolution can be grouped into those
underlining socioeconomic and family demo-
graphic pathways and into those theorizing the
remaining net association between parental
education and union dissolution (e.g., Lyngstad,
2006; Todesco, 2013).
First, parents’ education can affect their off-
spring’s family dissolution risks because of the
intergenerational transmission of educational
attainment. The persistent positive association
between parental and offspring’s education is
among the most consistent findings in the social
sciences (Breen & Jonsson, 2005), but whether
higher parental education promotes family
stability or not through this pathway depends
on the relationship between own educational
attainment and family dissolution. Higher levels
of education were in many countries related to
elevated family dissolution risks just a couple
of decades ago, but this relationship has today
largely disappeared or reversed to a negative
one (Goode, 1962; Härkönen & Dronkers, 2006;
Matysiak et al., 2014): As family dissolution
became more common, it is the lower educated,
rather than the higher educated, who experience
the highest family dissolution risks. Thus, the
role of intergenerational educational transmis-
sion in shaping the association between parental
education and family dissolution is contingent
on the educational gradient of family dissolution
that prevails in each society and time period.
Second, parental education can affect the
risk of family dissolution through family
demographic pathways. Parental separation is
a well-known predictor of individuals’ own
union dissolution, and this relationship is found
in a range of countries (Dronkers & Härkö-
nen, 2008; Wolfinger, 2003). If education was
associated with separation risk in the parental
generation, then parental separation can be
one of the pathways linking parental educa-
tion to family dissolution. Again, because the
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educational gradient of separation and divorce
varies cross-nationally and over time, the asso-
ciation between parental education and parental
separation can vary as well. Parental separation
can thus increase the family dissolution risk
among those with highly educated parents or
with low educated parents, depending on the
association between education and separation in
the parental generation.
Parental education is associated with two
features of the family formation process that
are important predictors of family dissolu-
tion, namely, the age at family formation and
marriage (e.g., Lyngstad & Jalovaara, 2010).
On average, children of higher socioeconomic
status (SES) parents form coresidential unions
and have children at a later age (e.g., Axinn
& Thornton, 1992; Rijken & Liefbroer, 2009;
Wiik, 2009), even when their own educational
level has been taken into account (Brons, Lief-
broer, & Ganzeboom, 2017; Dahlberg, 2015).
Later age at family formation is one of the most
robust predictors of family stability (Lyngstad
& Jalovaara, 2010).
Many studies (e.g., Axinn & Thornton, 1992;
South, 2001) have also found that higher parental
SES predicts postponement of marriage. How-
ever, although those with higher SES parents
may marry later, it is less clear whether they
are less likely to be married at the time they
have children in a coresidential relationship,
which are the unions we consider in this study.
On one hand, those with higher SES parents
have been argued to be less traditional (e.g.,
Lesthaeghe, 1995). On the other hand, mar-
riage is less reversible than cohabitation, even
when children are involved, and higher edu-
cated parents and their children generally have
a higher stake in the former than in the lat-
ter (Wiik, 2009). Furthermore, those from more
advantaged backgrounds can be more likely
to be married because of their longer partner
search and later age at family formation. Recent
findings suggest that the association between
parental education and the partnership context at
entry into parenthood is, too, societally contin-
gent, and low parental education predicts child-
bearing within cohabitation more strongly in
North America and Eastern Europe than in West
Europe (Koops, Liefbroer, & Gauthier, 2017).
Figure 1 summarizes the expected pathways
from parents’ education to offspring’s fam-
ily dissolution. Although some studies found
that the association between parental SES and
family dissolution disappeared once observed
socio-economic and demographic factors had
been controlled for (Berrington & Diamond,
1999; Bracher et al., 1993; Bumpass et al., 1991;
Kiernan, 1986), several studies have reported
a remaining, positive relationship (e.g., Hoem
& Hoem, 1992; Janssen, 2001; Klijzing, 1992;
Lyngstad, 2004, 2006; Todesco, 2013).
This net association has been theorized
as reflecting unmeasured class-related socio-
cultural factors or financial support from the
parents. Hoem and Hoem (1992) speculated that
the higher divorce risk of Swedish women from
higher class backgrounds reflects these women’s
and their parents’ embrace of a “bourgeois cul-
ture,” which is more accepting of divorce (see
also Lyngstad, 2004, p. 135, 2006, p. 50). Rijken
and Liefbroer (2012) found that education is
positively related to approval of divorce among
Europeans. Yet higher parental education can
also relate to sociocultural factors that stabilize
families. In the United States, education has
over time become negatively associated with the
approval of divorce, which can reflect socioeco-
nomically diverging benefits to stable marriages
(Martin & Parashar, 2006). It is also possible
that educated parents are more knowledgeable
about the (negative) consequences of family
dissolution. Although the available evidence
is not straightforward (cf. Amato, 1996), the
literature on own education and divorce has
furthermore argued that educated couples have
better interpersonal skills (Blossfeld, de Rose,
Hoem, & Rohwer, 1995; Härkönen & Dronkers,
2006), and educated parents can pass these skills
on to their children.
Better-educated parents are in a better situ-
ation to financially support their adult children
(Lyngstad, 2006; Todesco, 2013). The potential
for receiving financial support may lower the
threshold for family dissolution by lowering its
perceived costs, but parental financial support
can alternatively stabilize families faced with
economic difficulties (Lyngstad, 2006). Higher
socioeconomic background and the economic
security it provides while growing up is also
related to better mental and physical health (Elo,
2009), which can lower the likelihood of fam-
ily dissolution (cf. Lyngstad & Jalovaara, 2010).
All in all, although previous studies have found
no or a positive net association between parental
education and family dissolution, there are rea-
sons to expect that the association can—at least
in some contexts—be negative as well.
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Figure 1. Hypothesized Pathways From Parental Education to Family Dissolution.
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Cross-National and Cohort Variation
The above discussion has repeatedly suggested
that the relationship between parental education
and family dissolution is not necessarily constant
over time or across societies. Below, we system-
atize this discussion.
Previously we pointed to the cross-national
and cohort variation in the educational gradient
of separation and divorce. This can produce
variation in the association between parental
education and family dissolution through two
pathways. First, variation in the educational
gradient of family dissolution in the parental
generation means variation in the associa-
tion between parental education and parental
separation. Second, educated parents tend to
have educated children. Whether this means
that the children of educated parents also have
more stable families will vary across societies,
depending on the association between own
education and family dissolution.
The association between parental education
and family dissolution can vary cross-nationally
and over time also because of variation in
the relationship between parental education
and family formation. According to the second
demographic transition theory (e.g., Lesthaeghe,
1995, 2010), nontraditional family forms, such
as childbearing within cohabitation, started
in the advantaged sections of society, from
where it gradually spread to other social groups.
However, empirical findings show that the
socioeconomic patterns of these changes show
important cross-national variation, and these
patterns continue to differ between societies
(Koops et al., 2017). Similar cross-national
variation can be found in the link between
parental SES and the timing of coresidential
unions (Brons et al., 2017).
This leads us to two hypotheses. First,
we expect that the gross association between
parental education and family dissolution varies
cross-nationally and that this variation dimin-
ishes after we control for parental separation,
educational attainment, and age and marriage
at family formation (Hypothesis 1). Our second
hypothesis is more specific and builds on the
documented change in the educational gradi-
ent of family dissolution (e.g., Härkönen &
Dronkers, 2006). We expect that the gross asso-
ciation between parental education and family
dissolution has changed from a positive to a
negative one because of a changing educational
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gradient in family dissolution (Hypothesis 2).
Note that this change is possible because of
changes in the divorce gradient either in the
parental or in the filial generations.
We also expect that the net association has
changed from positive to negative. Also, this
expectation builds on the literature on the
changing relationship between individuals’ own
education and divorce. Goode (1962) theorized
that divorce was the privilege of the privileged
in societies where divorcing was difficult and
required resources for dealing with its legal and
social consequences, but as divorcing became
easier and more common it became accessible
to the lower socioeconomic strata as well. If
the perceived benefits of stable family life have
diverged, those with higher education may have
developed more restrictive attitudes toward it
(Martin & Parashar, 2006). These mechanisms
can extend beyond the association between
achieved status (own education) and family dis-
solution to that between ascribed status (parental
education) and family dissolution (cf. Todesco,
2013). Moreover, traits that stabilize families
may have become more important in high
divorce contexts, and to the extent that parental
education promotes such traits, it will increas-
ingly promote family stability. Therefore, we
expect that the net association between parental
education and family dissolution has changed
from positive to negative (Hypothesis 3).
The previous discussion suggests that the
net association between parental education
and family dissolution is different in societies
with a high divorce rate compared to a low
one. The related empirical literature on own
education and divorce has similarly reported
that the educational gradient of divorce tends
to be (more) negative in times and societies in
which it is more common to divorce (Härkö-
nen & Dronkers, 2006; Matysiak et al., 2014).
Our theorizing of the net association between
parental education and family dissolution sug-
gests similar patterns, and we thus expect that
the net association between parental education
and family dissolution is positive in societies
with low divorce rates, but nil or even negative in
societies with high divorce rates (Hypothesis 4).
Last, we discussed how the net association
between parental education and family dissolu-
tion can reflect differences in financial condi-
tions and economic support from the parents,
although whether this would (de)stabilize fam-
ilies is not obvious. Parents’ financial resources
can lower the threshold of family dissolution by
providing (the promise of) means to deal with its
consequences. On the other hand, these means
can stabilize families by lowering financial stress
or foster traits during childhood that enhance
family stability. Either way, parental financial
resources should play a smaller role in welfare
states that are more generous. Härkönen and
Dronkers (2006) found that the educational gra-
dient of divorce was less negative in such con-
texts. We hypothesize that the net association
between parental education and family dissolu-
tion is weaker in countries with a generous wel-
fare state (Hypothesis 5).
Method
Data
We use data from 17 European countries. Data
for 16 countries come from the first wave of the
GGS. The data were collected in different years
in the different countries, between 2002 and
2013 (Fokkema, Kveder, Hiekel, Emery, & Lief-
broer, 2016). We chose the countries for which
sufficiently detailed information was available
on the partnership history, parental and individ-
ual educational attainment, and parental separa-
tion, namely, Austria, Belgium, Bulgaria, Czech
Republic, Estonia, France, Georgia, Hungary,
Italy, Lithuania, Netherlands, Norway, Poland,
Romania, Russia, and Sweden. For the United
Kingdom, we use the Harmonized Histories data
set created by the Non-Marital Childbearing net-
work and made publicly available to the Gender
and Generations Programme research commu-
nity (for information, see Perelli-Harris, Kreyen-
feld, & Kubisch, 2010). The Harmonized His-
tories data set consists of data from the British
Household Panel Survey, collected in 2005 and
2006 and made comparable to GGS. Missing or
inconsistent data led us to exclude some interest-
ing countries. The U.S. data in the Harmonized
Histories data set does not have information
on parental separation, and this variable is not
correct in the German GGS. The Australian
GGS does not include information on unmarried
cohabiting couples.
We excluded the oldest childbearing union
cohorts, which started before 1970, because our
country-level indicators (discussed later) are not
representative for them (available from 1970
onward). Moreover, we excluded all respondents
without children because we focus on the disso-
lution of childbearing unions, which resulted in a
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sample of 92,862 respondents. Furthermore, we
excluded respondents with missing information
on at least one of the independent variables, lead-
ing to our analytical sample of 84,045 men and
women in 17 countries who had their first child
within a coresidential union after 1970. The
overall percentage of respondents with missing
variables was 9.5%, ranging from 2% in Italy to
22% in Russia. Parental and own education and
parental separation were the variables with most
missing information. As a robustness check, we
performed our analyses with multiple imputed
data and found that the results were almost iden-
tical to the ones with our analytical sample.
Dependent Variable
Our dependent variable is family dissolution,
defined as the dissolution of one’s first child-
bearing union (irrespective of marital status).
Most previous studies have focused on divorce,
but because of the increase in cohabitation as
a stable family form (Andersson, Thomson, &
Duntava, 2017; Heuveline & Timberlake, 2004),
focusing on divorce is too restrictive, especially
in light of the cross-national and cohort coverage
of our data. Childbearing unions, that is, coresi-
dential unions involving a common child, are a
more comparable family type as they can in all
European countries be seen as a stable and seri-
ous relationship form.
Of the 84,045 respondents in our analytical
sample, 15,774 (19%) dissolved their childbear-
ing union within the observation window. We
converted the data into a person-year format
for discrete-time event history analyses (Allison,
1984), which we chose because of the ease of
handling time-varying covariates (in our case,
individuals’ own educational attainment). The
results are robust to using months as the units
of analysis or Cox regression as the method. The
respondents become at risk of family dissolution
when their first child was born within a coresi-
dential union, irrespective ofmarital status. They
were followed until the year of the separation,
until the year of the interview, or up to a maxi-
mum of 20 years.
Independent Variables
Our main independent variable is parental
education. The highest level of education of
both parents is available for all 17 countries,
which we converted into a comparative measure
of educational level, the International Stan-
dard Level of Education (ISLED; Schröder &
Ganzeboom, 2014). Its advantage over the Inter-
national Standard Classification of Education
(ISCED) is that the ISLED is more fine grained,
is sensitive to differences in educational systems
between countries, and allows for continuous
scaling (range 0–100). We use the average score
of fathers’ and mothers’ education because we
are interested in the overall effect of parental
education rather than whether fathers or moth-
ers are more influential. This average score was
standardized to a Z-metric (mean= 0, standard
deviation= 1) within each country. The results
were robust to using the highest parental level
of education instead of the average.
Parental separation is measured by a dummy
variable, which is unity if the parents ever sepa-
rated and zero if not. Time-varying information
on the respondents’ highest level of completed
education was also converted into ISLED and
expressed in a Z-standardizedmetric within each
country. The last two mediating variables are the
age at the start of the childbearing union, which
ranges from age 15 to age 60, and a dummy
variable indicating whether the respondent was
married at the beginning of the union. We con-
trol for gender in each model. Union duration is
expressed as linear and squared years since the
beginning of the union. The year in which the
childbearing union started (union cohort) was
used to construct a continuous cohort variable
(cohorts ranged between 1970 and 2013). The
country-specific descriptives of all independent
variables and of the dependent variable can be
found in Table 1.
Country-Level Indicators
We use country-level measures of the crude
divorce rate and welfare state generosity, which
we use to assess whether the association between
parental education and family dissolution is
modified by these country-level characteristics
(Hypotheses 4 and 5). In both cases, we con-
structed separate measures for an old cohort
(start of childbearing union before 1988) and
a young cohort (1988 or later) to account for
changes in the divorce rate and welfare states.
The cutoff point of 1988 divides the number of
respondents evenly between the two cohorts and
ensures a sufficient number of respondents as
well as non missing values for the macro-level
variables for each country cohort.
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The average crude divorce rate per country for
the older cohort is the average of crude divorce
rates from the years 1970 and 1985, derived from
World Marriage Data 2008 (United Nations,
2009). The average divorce rate for the youngest
cohort is based on the country-specific crude
divorce rates for 1995 and 2005 derived from
World Marriage Data 2008 (United Nations,
2009) and for the year 2011 derived from the
United Nations Demographic Yearbook (2013)
(United Nations, 2013). Although not a perfect
measure of family instability, the crude divorce
rate is a readily available aggregate measure that
correlates highly with more appropriate mea-
sures (Amato, 2010). It thus serves as a proxy
for costs and availability of family dissolution.
To test whether welfare state generosity mod-
ifies the cross-national variation in the net asso-
ciation between parental education and family
dissolution (Hypothesis 5), we calculated for
each country cohort the average social secu-
rity transfers as a share of the gross domestic
product, derived from the Comparative Political
Data Set (Armingeon, Isler, Knöpfel, Weisstan-
ner, & Engler, 2016). Unfortunately, there were
no data available for Russia and Georgia, and
only for half of the countries for the old cohort.
Because of this, the analysis using welfare state
generosity is based on a more restricted sam-
ple of 23 country cohorts. The descriptives of
these macro-level indicators can also be found
in Table 1.
Analytical Strategy
Our analysis proceeds in three steps. First, we
estimate discrete-time event history regressions
separately for each country. We estimate two
models. The baseline model estimates the gross
association between parental education and fam-
ily dissolution, controlling for gender, duration
(linear and squared), and year of birth. The sec-
ond model estimates the net association between
parental education and family dissolution after
adding the mediators parental separation, indi-
viduals’ own educational attainment, the age at
the start of the childbearing union, and whether
the couple was married at the beginning of
the union. In additional analyses, commented
on in the text and presented in the Appendix,
we entered these mediators stepwise (first, the
parental separation, then educational attainment
and finally, the family formation variables). The
results were almost identical to those estimated
with the Karlson–Holm–Breen (Karlson, Holm,
& Breen, 2012) method, which is immune to
the rescaling bias in logistic regression mod-
els, so we present the more familiar odds ratios
from the discrete-time event history models.
The results were also robust when we ana-
lyzed multiple imputed data, as mentioned pre-
viously.
We summarize the cross-national variation
in these estimates by using tools generally
employed in meta-analyses. We did this because
of the small number of countries in our study
(N < 30), which restricts the use of multilevel
models (Bryan & Jenkins, 2016). Using the esti-
mated odds ratios and their confidence intervals
as input, we estimate the between-country het-
erogeneity coefficient I2, which is the percentage
of observed total variation across countries as a
result of real heterogeneity rather than chance. I2
is calculated as 100%× (Q− df)/Q, where Q is
Cochran’s heterogeneity statistic and df stands
for degrees of freedom (Harris et al., 2008).
I2 ranges between 0% and 100%. Estimates
above 50% can be interpreted as indicating
“substantial” cross-national variation, and
estimates above 75% indicate “considerable”
cross-national variation (cf. Higgins, Thompson,
Deeks, & Altman, 2003). I2 for the estimates
from the first model tells about cross-national
variation in the gross association between
parental education and family dissolution risk,
and I2 for the second model tells about the
cross-national variation in the net association.
I2 was estimated using the metan command in
Stata 14 (StataCorp, 2015).
Second, we analyze whether the gross and
net associations have changed over time. We
estimate the baseline models with an interac-
tion term between union cohort and parental
education, separately for each country. We con-
tinue to analyze the countries in which the gross
association has changed, selected using likeli-
hood ratio tests. We first add the four mediating
variables to assess whether these family demo-
graphic and socioeconomic pathways explain
any of the change in the association between
parental education and family dissolution. Then
we add an interaction term between union cohort
and own education to assess whether changes
in the educational gradient of family dissolu-
tion explain changes in the parental educational
gradient.
Third, we analyze whether the net
associations—the estimates from the second
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Figure 2. The Gross Association Between Parental Education and Family Dissolution.
Overall  (I-squared = 87.8%, p = 0.000)
Bulgaria
France
Lithuania
Czech Republic
Austria
Sweden
Netherlands
Estonia
country
Norway
Russia
Georgia
Poland
Italy
Hungary
Belgium
United Kingdom
Romania
1.09 (1.03, 1.14)
1.13 (1.04, 1.22)
0.96 (0.90, 1.02)
1.08 (1.00, 1.16)
1.01 (0.95, 1.09)
1.20 (1.09, 1.32)
1.02 (0.97, 1.09)
Odds
1.12 (1.04, 1.21)
0.99 (0.92, 1.05)
Ratio (95% CI)
0.97 (0.92, 1.02)
1.14 (1.08, 1.21)
1.28 (1.16, 1.41)
1.27 (1.21, 1.34)
1.22 (1.12, 1.33)
1.11 (1.05, 1.18)
1.04 (0.96, 1.13)
0.92 (0.86, 0.99)
1.08 (0.99, 1.16)
1.8 1.2 1.4
Note. Meta-analysis with discrete-time event history models (odds ratios and 95% confidence intervals are presented).
Controlled for gender, year childbearing union started, duration, and duration squared.
discrete-time event history model—are sys-
tematically associated with our contextual
variables. Again, as a result of our small number
of countries, multilevel models would not be
appropriate in particular for estimating of the
cross-level interactions between the parental
education and the time-varying, country-level
variables (Bryan & Jenkins, 2016). Using
meta-analytic tools (meta-regressions) for
cross-national data, the country-specific
estimates of the net association of parental
education and family dissolution are regressed
separately on the contextual variables (Harbord
& Higgins, 2008). Because the country-level
indicators changed over time, we divided our
sample into two groups (an old [before 1988]
and young union cohort [1988 and later]) and
regressed the available country-cohort-specific
estimates of the net effect of parental education
on the macro-level indicators. The samples
for the respective analyses are the 34 country
cohorts for which we had information on the
crude divorce rate and the 23 country cohorts
for which we had measures of welfare state
generosity. The country cohorts are weighted
by the inverse of the standard error so that
those with more precise estimates have more
influence. These models were estimated using
the robumeta command in Stata 14 (Stata-
Corp, 2015), because with this command we
could cluster estimates by country.
Results
Parental Education and Dissolution in 17
Countries
Figure 2 shows the gross associations between
parental education on union dissolution (the
baseline model), and Figure 3 shows the net
associations (thus, after adjusting for the medi-
ating variables), respectively, for each country.
The figures present the point estimates and the
95% confidence intervals for the odds ratios.
The diamond at the bottom of the figures
presents the average estimate for the 17 coun-
tries, inversely weighted by their standard
errors to take into account the precision of
the estimates. The I2 provides an estimate of the
cross-country heterogeneity in the associations.
The countries were ordered by the ascending
gross association. In the United Kingdom, hav-
ing highly educated parents was associated with
a lower risk of family dissolution (Figure 2).
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Figure 3. The Net Association Between Parental Education and Family Dissolution.
Overall  (I-squared = 74.3%,
              p = 0.000)
Netherlands
Hungary
Estonia
Italy
Bulgaria
Poland
Austria
Russia
Georgia
Czech Republic
Norway
Belgium
country
Lithuania
Romania
France
United Kingdom
Sweden
1.12 (1.08, 1.16)
1.16 (1.08, 1.26)
1.23 (1.15, 1.32)
Odds
1.01 (0.94, 1.08)
1.13 (1.02, 1.24)
1.19 (1.09, 1.30)
1.25 (1.19, 1.32)
1.20 (1.08, 1.33)
1.15 (1.08, 1.21)
1.25 (1.12, 1.40)
1.08 (1.00, 1.16)
1.08 (1.02, 1.14)
1.08 (0.99, 1.18)
Ratio (95% CI)
1.10 (1.01, 1.19)
1.10 (1.01, 1.20)
1.02 (0.94, 1.10)
1.01 (0.94, 1.08)
1.09 (1.03, 1.16)
1.8 1.2 1.4
Note. Meta-analysis with discrete-time event history models (odds ratios and 95% confidence intervals are presented).
Controlled for gender, year childbearing union started, duration, duration squared, parental separation, own education, age at
family formation, and married at family formation.
The association was not statistically significant
in six countries (France, Norway, Estonia, the
Czech Republic, Sweden, and Belgium), and
positive in the remaining 10 countries. In these
countries, having highly educated parents was
associated with a higher risk of family dissolu-
tion. The positive association was the strongest
in Italy, Poland, and Georgia. The overall effect
was likewise positive (odds ratio= 1.09), but the
I2 estimate of 87.8% confirmed the considerable
cross-country variation in these associations.
Figure 3 presents the net associations
between parental education and family dis-
solution risk. The stepwise models are found
in the Appendix (Figures A1 and A2). Figure 3
shows that the overall association between
parental education and family dissolution
became marginally more positive after including
parental separation, individuals’ own education,
and age and marriage at the start of the child-
bearing union as mediators (odds ratio= 1.12).
The cross-national heterogeneity decreased
somewhat (I2 = 74.3%), although it could still
be interpreted as being considerable.
With the clearest exception of Italy, the esti-
mates moved toward more positive ones in each
country. This result was confirmed with the
Karlson–Holm–Breen method, which is not sen-
sitive to rescaling unlike nonlinear methods.
After adjusting for the mediating variables, no
negative and statistically significant associations
remained. The associations were not statistically
significant in the United Kingdom, France, Esto-
nia, and Belgium, and positive and significant in
all the other countries. The shift toward more
positive associations was the clearest in Nor-
way and Czech Republic, where the associa-
tions changed from no association to a positive
association.
The difference between the gross and net
effects generally implied that higher parental
education was in many countries associated with
pathways that promote family stability, which
also suppressed the mostly positive net associa-
tion between parental education and family dis-
solution. The stepwise analyses, shown in the
Appendix, pointed to own educational attain-
ment and family formation as such important
pathways. Regarding the former, highly edu-
cated parents tended to have highly educated
children, who in many of the countries were
less likely to experience family dissolution. This
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pattern was the opposite in Italy, where own
education was positively associated with family
dissolution. Children of highly educated parents
were also often older and more likely to be
married at the beginning of their childbearing
union, which stabilized their families.
Did the Parental Educational Gradient
Change?
We hypothesized that the gross as well as the
net associations between parental education
and family dissolution changed from positive
to negative (Hypotheses 2 and 3). To test these
hypotheses, we first ran interaction models
separately for each country, interacting parental
education with the year in which the childbear-
ing union started (union cohort), with controls
for gender, duration, and duration squared. This
model tested whether there had been a shift in
the gross association between parental education
and family dissolution.
This interaction model improved the model fit
at the 5% level of significance (assessed by like-
lihood ratio tests) in five countries (Belgium,
Bulgaria, Norway, Sweden, and the United
Kingdom). In addition, the interaction was
significant in Austria once we controlled for the
mediating variables (Model 2). These findings
imply that the gross or net (or both) associ-
ation between parental education and family
dissolution had changed over time in these six
countries, which we focus more closely on next.
Table 2 presents the results from three mod-
els. The union cohorts were centered at the mean
union cohort for each country, and the estimate
for parental education showed that the gross
association between parental education and fam-
ily dissolution riskwas, in those cohorts, positive
in Austria and Bulgaria; zero in Belgium, Nor-
way, and Sweden; and negative in the United
Kingdom. The interaction coefficient indicated
that the association became (more) negative over
time in all countries but Austria, where the coef-
ficient was not significant. Furthermore, predic-
tions based on the model showed that the gross
association switched from positive to negative
in Belgium, Bulgaria, Norway, and Sweden dur-
ing the observation window, and a negative asso-
ciation opened up in the United Kingdom (not
shown).
The second model added controls for parental
separation, own education, age at family forma-
tion, and marriage at family formation. Having
separated parents increased the family disso-
lution risk, whereas being older and married
at the beginning of the childbearing union
had stabilizing effects. Own education was
negatively associated with family dissolution
risk in Norway, Sweden, and the United King-
dom, but there was no association in the other
three countries. More important for this study,
the interaction effect between union cohort and
parental education remained almost unchanged
in Belgium, Sweden, and the United Kingdom,
but became smaller in Bulgaria and Norway,
and maybe surprisingly, larger and significant in
Austria.
The third model included the interaction
between own education and union cohort.
Model 3 showed that in all countries, there
remained a significant change in the associ-
ation between parental education and family
dissolution, also after including the changing
educational gradient of family dissolution in the
children’s generation. The interaction between
own education and union cohort was significant
and negative only in Sweden. In Sweden, the
interaction between parental education and birth
cohort became smaller, but remained signifi-
cant. Thus, in Sweden, the increasingly negative
educational gradient of family dissolution in the
children’s generation had been partly respon-
sible for the changing association between
parental education and family dissolution.
Variation by divorce rate and welfare state
generosity
Figures 4 and 5 present the results of the anal-
ysis of the moderating role of the crude divorce
rate and welfare state generosity on the net asso-
ciation of parental education and family disso-
lution. To account for changes in the net asso-
ciation as well as the crude divorce rate and
welfare state generosity, we divided our sample
into an old and young cohort. The net associa-
tion within each country cohort was regressed on
these country-level indicators.
We expected to find a negative association
between the average crude divorce rate and the
parental educational gradient of family disso-
lution (Hypothesis 4). Figure 4 indeed shows
that the net association between parental edu-
cation and family dissolution risk tended to be
clearly positive in country cohorts where the
average divorce rate was low, but weak in coun-
try cohorts where the average divorce rate was
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Table 2. Discrete-Time Event History Analysis of Cohort Change in the Association Between Parental Education and Family
Dissolution
Countries Variables Model 1 Model 2 Model 3
Austria Parental education 1.144 (0.064)* 1.112 (0.066) 1.109 (0.068)
N = 2,493 Year union started 0.983 (0.009)* 0.980 (0.010) 0.981 (0.010)
Parental Education × Union Year 0.986 (0.008) 0.977 (0.008)** 0.976 (0.009)**
Parental separation 1.682 (0.183)** 1.683 (0.183)**
Own education 0.969 (0.045) 0.977 (0.068)
Age at family formation 0.950 (0.013)** 0.950 (0.013)**
Married 0.212 (0.023)** 0.212 (0.023)**
Own Education × Union Year 1.001 (0.006)
Likelihood-ratio 𝜒2 (df ) 36.46 (6) 293.37 (10) 293.39 (11)
Belgium Parental education 1.021 (0.042) 1.061 (0.049) 1.059 (0.049)
N = 3,361 Year union started 1.020 (0.005)** 1.017 (0.005)** 1.017 (0.005)**
Parental Education × Union Year 0.988 (0.004)** 0.987 (0.004)** 0.988 (0.004)**
Parental separation 1.448 (0.164)** 1.450 (0.164)**
Own education 0.965 (0.041) 0.968 (0.039)
Age at family formation 0.950 (0.010)** 0.950 (0.009)**
Married 0.401 (0.051)** 0.401 (0.051)**
Own Education × Union Year 0.998 (0.003)
Likelihood-ratio 𝜒2 (df ) 65.81 (6) 162.80 (10) 163.04 (11)
Bulgaria Parental education 1.098 (0.047)* 1.163 (0.054)** 1.160 (0.054)**
N = 6,028 Year union started 1.011 (0.006) 1.001 (0.006) 1.001 (0.006)
Parental Education × Union Year 0.985 (0.005)** 0.988 (0.005)* 0.987 (0.005)*
Parental separation 1.808 (0.226)** 1.814 (0.227)**
Own education 0.981 (0.039) 0.988 (0.043)
Age at family formation 0.988 (0.010) 0.988 (0.010)
Married 0.439 (0.064)** 0.436 (0.064)**
Own Education × Union Year 1.002 (0.004)
Likelihood-ratio 𝜒2 (df ) 41.94 (6) 98.77 (10) 99.01 (11)
Norway Parental education 0.952 (0.026) 1.058 (0.032) 1.061 (0.032)*
N = 7,397 Year union started 1.013 (0.003)** 0.992 (0.003)* 0.992 (0.003)*
Parental Education × Union Year 0.989 (0.003)** 0.991 (0.003)** 0.993 (0.003)*
Parental separation 1.517 (0.102)** 1.515 (0.102)**
Own education 0.914 (0.025)** 0.907 (0.026)**
Age at family formation 0.953 (0.006)** 0.953 (0.006)**
Married 0.234 (0.015)** 0.235 (0.015)**
Own Education × Union Year 0.997 (0.003)
Likelihood-ratio 𝜒2 (df ) 62.41 (6) 747.07 (10) 748.29 (11)
Sweden Parental education 0.998 (0.031) 1.065 (0.034)* 1.069 (0.034)*
N = 4,969 Year union started 1.003 (0.003) 0.996 (0.003) 0.995 (0.003)
Parental Education × Union Year 0.987 (0.003)** 0.987 (0.003)** 0.989 (0.003)**
Parental separation 1.543 (0.100)** 1.550 (0.101)**
Own education 0.943 (0.029) 0.896 (0.027)**
Age at family formation 0.938 (0.006)** 0.939 (0.027)**
Married 0.276 (0.017)** 0.276 (0.017)**
Own Education × Union Year 0.992 (0.002)**
Likelihood-ratio 𝜒2 (df ) 48.75 (6) 661.37 (10) 673.31 (11)
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Table 2. continued
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3
United Parental education 0.909 (0.032)** 0.989 (0.036) 0.989 (0.036)
Kingdom Year union started 1.025 (0.004)** 1.019 (0.004)** 1.019 (0.004)**
N = 3,742 Parental Education × Union Year 0.992 (0.004)* 0.993 (0.004)* 0.993 (0.004)#
Parental separation 1.211 (0.095)* 1.211 (0.095)*
Own education 0.884 (0.031)** 0.885 (0.038)**
Age at family formation 0.929 (0.007)** 0.929 (0.007)**
Married 0.322 (0.032)** 0.322 (0.032)**
Own Education × Union Year 1.000 (0.004)
Likelihood-ratio 𝜒2 (df ) 111.74 (6) 455.84 (10) 455.85 (11)
Note. Odds ratios and standard errors are presented. All models are additionally controlled for gender, duration, and duration
squared.
#p< .10. *p< .05. **p< .01.
The bold data show the cohort change in the parental educational gradient, which is the main result of this table.
high. Despite the negative slope (b=−0.029),
the association was not statistically significant.
When we excluded the younger Russian cohort
as an influential outlier—identified as such by
its crude divorce rate that was more than 1.5
times interquartile range after the third quartile
(Tukey, 1977)—the association became stronger
and statistically significant (b=−0.053, p= .03;
see Figure A3 in the Appendix). Thus, there was
some evidence of a negative association between
the divorce rate and the net association.
We also expected that the net associa-
tion between parental education and family
dissolution was stronger in countries with a less
generous welfare state than in countries with
a more generous welfare state (Hypothesis 5).
Figure 5 shows no clear pattern between the net
association of parental education on family dis-
solution and welfare state generosity (b= 0.010,
p= nonsignificant). Unlike in Figure 4, there
were no influential outliers that affected the
results.
Discussion
We analyzed the association between parental
education and family dissolution in 17 European
countries. The scholarly attention to educational
differences in family demography and to fam-
ily background effects on life chances has not
translated to similar interest in parental educa-
tion and family stability, and our study is the
first cross-national analysis on this subject. Doc-
umenting the parental background differences in
family stability contributes to a more compre-
hensive understanding of stratification in family
demography, and analysis of its cross-national
differences adds to the understanding of the soci-
etal factors associated with this stratification.
In most countries, having highly educated
parents is either not related to the risk of family
dissolution or it predicts a higher dissolution
risk. This was true (with one exception, the
United Kingdom) for the gross association, and
the view of a positive association was reinforced
once adjusting for parental separation, own edu-
cational attainment, and age and marital status
at family formation. Our findings of a gener-
ally positive association are mostly in line with
earlier ones (cf. Lyngstad & Jalovaara, 2010),
but systematize these results by being the first
cross-national analysis of parental educational
differences in family dissolution.
Both the gross and the net associations
between parental education and family dis-
solution showed considerable cross-national
variation, although the variation in the associa-
tion diminished, as expected, once we adjusted
for some important socioeconomic and family
demographic pathways (in support of our first
hypothesis). However, partly contrasting our
second and third hypotheses, we found general
stability in the gross and net associations. The
gross association had changed (toward more
negative) in five of the 17 countries, and the
net association showed similar change in six
of the 17 countries. In general, the change in
the association between parental education and
family dissolution in these countries could not
be explained by sociodemographic factors or
by the changing association of own education
and family dissolution. In the remaining 11
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Figure 4. The Association Between the Net Effect of Parental Education and Union Dissolution, and the
Average Crude Divorce Rate.
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Figure 5. The Association Between the Net Effect of Parental Education on Union Dissolution and Average
Social Security Transfers (as % of Gross Domestic Product).
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countries, the parental educational gradient of
separation has remained stable. In addition to
differences in sample sizes and the cohorts
covered, the countries where the gross or
net association changed can have been more
advanced in the second demographic transition
(the United Kingdom, Norway, and Sweden as
the best examples), but strong conclusions are
difficult to draw.
To better understand the variation across
countries and over time, we divided the data into
an old and young cohort in each country and
used techniques familiar from meta-analysis
to regress the net association between parental
education and family dissolution in these coun-
try cohorts on the crude divorce rate and on
welfare state generosity. We hypothesized that
the net association should be positive in country
cohorts with a lower divorce rate (Hypothesis
4) and in country cohorts with a less generous
welfare state (Hypothesis 5), but nil or even
negative when the divorce rate is higher and
the welfare state more generous. We found
suggestive evidence for the fourth hypothesis,
which was stronger after excluding Russia as
an influential case from the analysis. Although
similar to other Eastern European countries with
regard to many features of the second demo-
graphic transition (Lesthaeghe, 2010), Russia
has a higher divorce rate that set it as an outlier in
the analysis. Possible reasons range from a high
prevalence of unintended pregnancies and sub-
sequent “shotgun” marriages (Zakharov, 2008)
to the social turmoil that followed the decline
and collapse of the Soviet Union. In contrast to
some support for the fourth hypothesis, we did
not find that the generosity of the welfare state
modified the net association between parental
education and family dissolution. However,
we have to keep in mind that the country-level
measures are averages over long periods (around
20 years); although averaging reduces measure-
ment error because of short-term fluctuations,
our long-term averages can hide trends that
shape the parental education–family dissolu-
tion relationship. We chose this conservative
strategy in response to criticisms of the use
of multilevel modeling—which can include
cross-classified random effects of the country
level and time—with a limited number of coun-
tries (Bryan & Jenkins, 2016). Nevertheless,
it is possible that we may have erred on the
conservative side in analyzing the country-level
moderators.
Lacking direct measures, the cross-national
analysis provides indirect evidence for the
hypothesized mechanisms behind the net rela-
tionship between parental education and family
dissolution. Despite a general lack of theorizing
of this association, the suggested mechanisms
can be grouped into sociocultural mechanisms
that emphasize class differences in (the inter-
generational transmission of) divorce-friendly
values and outlooks and into economic mech-
anisms that underline the financial support
better-educated parents can provide their chil-
dren. Related to the latter, we expected that
family dissolution would be more strongly asso-
ciated with parental education in less generous
welfare states (our fifth hypothesis). This was
not the case. Our suggestive finding that the
net association was related to the crude divorce
rate is more in line with the sociocultural expla-
nation. When divorcing means breaking social
and legal norms, it requires social and cultural
resources that often come with high (ascribed
or attained) status, but these resources become
less important when divorce is democratized
(Goode, 1962). Previous research has found
evidence for this interpretation regarding the
educational gradient of divorce (Härkönen
& Dronkers, 2006; Matysiak et al., 2014),
and our study extended this to the associa-
tion between parental education and family
dissolution.
Research on the stratification of family dis-
solution has documented large variation in the
relationship between own educational attain-
ment and family dissolution over time and across
countries (Härkönen & Dronkers, 2006; Martin,
2006; Matysiak et al., 2014). We found variation
in the relationship between parental education
and family dissolution as well, but this variation
appears less dramatic than the one between own
education and family dissolution. Although the
size of the relationship between parental educa-
tion and family dissolution varies considerably,
it is generally positive—this is especially clear
in the case of the net association—whereas the
educational gradient of family dissolution has
more clearly varied both in size and in sign
(Blossfeld et al., 1995; Härkönen & Dronkers,
2006; Matysiak et al., 2014). Similarly, the
educational gradient of family dissolution has
changed in several countries, often from pos-
itive to negative (Chan & Halpin, 2008; De
Graaf & Kalmijn, 2006; Härkönen & Dronkers,
2006; Hoem, 1997; Raymo & Iwasawa, 2017),
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whereas our findings point primarily to stability
in the relationship between parental education
and family dissolution.
These results add nuance to perspectives
on stratification in family dissolution, which
is dominated by views of the increasingly
lower status nature of family instability (e.g.,
McLanahan, 2004). Parental and individuals’
own education are of course not the same, but
our findings suggest that family dissolution
is not generally and increasingly related to
low social status regardless of the status mea-
sure. Instead, the generally positive association
between parental education and family dissolu-
tion suggests first of all that family background
may ameliorate the inequality consequences
of family instability. Second, our findings also
show that high parental background does not
always lead to positive outcomes with regard
to family demography and future life chances,
given that the association between parental
education and family dissolution is positive and
the dominantly negative consequences of family
dissolution on adults and children.
This finding also raises intriguing ques-
tions about the impact of parental and own
education on family dissolution because it is
far from obvious to expect that parental and
own education predict family dissolution in
opposite ways, as seems to be the case in many
countries (see also Lyngstad, 2006; Lyngstad
& Jalovaara, 2010). Future research should
formulate additional hypotheses about why
parental and own education can predict family
dissolution in opposite ways. Future research
should also assess whether our conclusion of
relative stability in the association between
parental education and family dissolution
holds; it is possible that is has become mostly
apparent in more recent cohorts and thus not
discovered by our linear trend analysis over
many cohorts or that there has been change in
countries we did not analyze. Understanding
these questions would contribute to understand-
ing stratification in family dissolution more
broadly.
Family dissolution is socially stratified. Our
analysis has contributed to understanding this
stratification by showing how parental education
predicts family dissolution in different coun-
tries and over time. A key lesson is that dif-
ferences in family instability by ascribed sta-
tus can be quite different from that by achieved
status.
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